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Stone Monuments and Flexible Laws: Removing Confederate Monuments Through Historic Preservation
Laws
Peter Byrne
Georgetown Law
Abstract: This essay is a comment on an article by Jess Phelps and Jessica Owley, Etched in Stone:
Historic Preservation Law and Confederate Monuments, published last year by the Florida Law Review.
Contrary to their claims, historic preservation law does not seriously impede the removal or
contextualization of Confederate memorials. The tangled and toxic heritage they signify does. The law
rather creates the context within which parties contend about the meaning and continuing value of
these monuments. Preservation law is not so much “etched in stone,” as a living requirement that we
collectively, carefully address what remnants of the past to retain and what to discard.
Jess Phelps and Jessica Owley present an informative and useful account of how historic
preservation laws might complicate or prevent efforts to remove Confederate monuments.1 Many
lawyers and activists will be grateful for this guidance. However, Phelps and Owley overstate the
burden historic preservation laws impose on such removal and ignore the benefits that of the
administrative processes they provide. They claim that our preservation laws embody a “relatively
frozen approach to cultural protection” and the heritage preservation should not be “etched in stone.”
While preservation restrictions should reflect greater cultural dynamism than may be common now,
they already facilitate changing perceptions of significant heritage to an impressive extent. Failing to
recognize this inadvertently plays into an ignorant and hostile narrative about preservation law as elitist
and undemocratic. 2
Phelps and Owley discuss a variety of federal, state, and local laws. Of these, the laws that most
directly prevent removal of confederate monuments are state statutes directly prohibiting local
governments and state instrumentalities, such as state universities, from removing war memorials from
public property.3 Despite the specious claims of some sponsors, such preemption legislation cannot be
considered to be bona fide preservation law. These statutes lack most of the features of the leading and
exemplary preservation laws, which have been enacted at the federal or local levels. They entirely lack
any requirements for historical documentation, consultation among experts and affected citizens, or
reputable findings of historic or cultural significance. Rather they are political efforts of state legislators
to confirm a particular view of the past held by their base supporters.4 While Phelps and Owley are right
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to include these state monument laws among those that advocates for removal must overcome, it is
misleading to list them among preservation laws. From a serious historic preservation perspective, all
these state monument statutes should be replaced by laws treating Confederate monuments like any
other cultural resource.
Before engaging with the legal issues, a brief discussion of why removal of Confederate
monuments usually will not offend the norms of historic preservation may be helpful. The purposes of
historic preservation include the conservation of the physical remains of the past that express the
significance of past people, events, movements, and places in order to give contemporary people a
sense of orientation to and meaning from their cultures and places.5 Plainly, not every building or
structure from the past can or should be saved from the normal processes of decay or replacement.
Monuments generally are problematic subjects for preservation. Under the widely influential standards
for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, “properties primarily commemorative in nature”
normally are not eligible for listing. 6 The reasons for this can be inferred from the other types of
resources normally not eligible, such as graves and reconstructed buildings. Such resources are created
consciously to shape cultural memory and often reflect biases that promote a fictitious or
propagandistic narrative about the subject. 7In the language of the National Park Service Bulletin
explaining the criteria:
Commemorative properties are designed or constructed after the occurrence of an important
historic event or after the life of an important person. They are not directly associated with the
event or with the person's productive life, but serve as evidence of a later generation's
assessment of the past. 8
Put more bluntly, monuments do not reliably tell us about the subject being commemorated, but only
about the mindset of those promoting the commemoration.
The normal exclusion of a monument from the National Register can be overcome “if design,
age, tradition, or symbolic value has invested it with its own exceptional significance”. A clear example
of a Civil War monument of exceptional aesthetic significance would be Augustus Saint-Gaudens' 1897
relief sculpture of Colonel Robert Shaw leading the Massachusetts 54th Regiment, the first unit
composed of African American troops and white officers, which has been termed “America's greatest
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public monument.”9 Very few Civil War memorials achieve a high level of aesthetic value, and those
that do usually can be moved from public prominence without losing their aesthetic significance.10
Far more complicated is the assessment of the historic significance of Confederate monuments
as expressing the viewpoints of the Southern whites who erected them. Notoriously, Confederate
monuments were erected in prominent public locations throughout the South primarily during the
period of intensifying Jim Crow subordination of African Americans to convey a heroic “Lost Cause”
interpretation of the Civil War and bolster white supremacy.11 No doubt for some at the time, simple
honoring of the sacrifice of former soldiers living and dead played a part in the commemoration
movement. Thus, the National Park Bulletin provides an example of a monument eligible for listing: “A
late 19th century statue erected on a courthouse square to commemorate Civil War veterans would
qualify if it reflects that era's shared perception of the noble character and valor of the veterans and
their cause.” But historic scholarship has firmly rooted the rapid spread of Confederate monuments
between 1895 and 1930 as part of a renewed push to institutionalize black subordination.12 And in
recent years, zeal for preserving these monuments has been embraced primarily by neo-Confederate
organizations, many of which espouse toxic forms of white nationalism. The public demand to remove
these monuments today often represents popular efforts by local communities to reject resurgent,
sometimes violent claims of white supremacy. Whatever heritage or aesthetic values these monuments
may possess are dwarfed by the danger they pose to African Americans, Jews, and community peace.
No community should be legally obligated to maintain public monuments supporting contemporary
claims of white supremacy. 13 The preservation challenge here is to engage with Confederate
monuments in a manner that respects the complex realities of Southern heritage, where, as Faulkner
famously wrote: “The past is never dead. It's not even past.”14
Defenders of Confederate monuments sometimes argue that removal is a denial of history.15
But this is a gross simplification. The Jim Crow era, the period for which the monuments have historic
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significance, is an important and painful era of history, but these heroic monuments to Confederate
leaders are problematic resources for conveying that significance, because they cast a cloak of Romantic
glory over the terrible cruelty and injustice of the racial subordination during that time. What continues
to be socially necessary, and broadly supported by public opinion, are efforts to tell the truth about the
brutal subordination of African Americans during that era, which included thoroughgoing economic
exploitation, political disenfranchisement, and social humiliation, all enforced through both official and
vigilante violence. Commemorative endeavors like the Legacy Museum in Montgomery, Alabama,
presenting the legacy of slavery, lynching, and segregation, correct the false heritage tales of the “Lost
Cause,” and speak to the continuing need to acknowledge and understand painful aspects of our
national history.16 The heritage value of most Confederate monuments can be adequately preserved in
museums, where their historical usage and the context of their time can be explained, or in battlefield
parks, where they can serve their commemorative function. 17
Let us turn now to consideration the claims of Phelps and Owley that historic preservation laws
are an impediment to removal of Confederate monuments. The authors provide a detailed account of
the applicability of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”) on the removal of
confederate monuments.18 They correctly note that the consultative process of 106 would need to be
followed if a federal agency would remove a monument eligible for inclusion on the National Register of
Historic Places, provide funds for such removal, or permit removal from federal land.19 However, Phelps
and Owley cannot identify any case in which Section 106 prevented removal of a monument or even
was successfully invoked to delay the removal of such a monument.20 They admit that Section 106 by its
terms would never substantively bar removal of any historic property, but express concern that it would
subject a federal agency to its procedures and thereby “discourage removal through its requirements for
a costly, controversial, and time-consuming process.”21
A federal administrative process to consider a proposal to remove a monument based on
historic research, community consultation, and the weighing of alternatives and mitigation measures
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likely would have substantial social value. Removal of confederate monuments is contentious because
different people have radically different views of what the monuments signify.22 As discussed above, for
proponents of removal, most such monuments primarily express a yearning to maintain white
supremacy, but for defenders they may primarily commemorate the blood sacrifice of their ancestors,
for a cause that an even smaller group believe to have been a noble attempt to maintain state
sovereignty. The gulf between these narratives cries out for a civil and informed dialogue. Section 106
provides a public pathway for ascertaining facts about the erection of a particular monument, the
clarification and critique of perspectives, and the search for acceptable mitigation. A historic
preservation law with this potential, which at the end of the day will not constrain a federal agency’s
choice of action, deserve commendation rather than criticism. How else can we collectively consider the
significance and curate the physical remains of a contentious and racist history?
Sadly, some defenders of the monuments embrace explicitly the white supremacy ideology
frequently inextricable from nostalgia for the Confederacy. Indeed, it has been the public celebration of
Confederate monuments by persons chanting racist sentiments that have made retention of many such
monuments intolerable.23 While local governments must respect the First Amendment rights of such
deluded persons, a subject beyond the scope of this brief Comment, no local government must retain
monuments expressing a destructive racist ideology. Removal of public monuments from public spaces
does not violate the First Amendment, because it would constitute government speech and not prohibit
the speech of any private person.24
One place where the NHPA might discourage removal of Confederate monuments would be
battlefield parks administered by the National Park Service (“NPS”). Many Civil War battlefields are
listed as historic districts on the National Register and, since the historic monuments are on federal land,
Section 106 surely would apply if removal were proposed. The NPS likely would resist removal of
historic Confederate memorials from its battlefield parks to protect the heritage value of the public
honoring of the soldiers engaged. In such a case, the determining factor would be the NPS’s sense of it
mission the agency, although the decision would emerge from the Section 106 process. As noted
above, Section 106 does not provide substantive protection to historic resources, only a process
requiring study and consultation. Nonetheless, retention of most Confederate monuments on battlefield
park sites seems appropriate. Civil War battlefields are very different from urban parks or courthouse
squares. They do not directly address contemporary civic life. They provide interpretative context about
both the Civil War and monuments for both armies. At Gettysburg, for example, exhibits in the Visitor
Center explain both the centrality of slavery to the War and the motives of those who erected
monuments. 25 This is a location where the cultural and commemorative significance of Confederate
monuments can be considered with the most benefit and least harm.
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In theory, local preservation laws pose a more complete barrier to removal of Confederate
monuments. As Phelps and Owley explain, many local preservation ordinances bar or delay demolition
and restrict the alteration, including relocation, of a designated landmark or structure contributing to a
designated historic district.26 Thus, a historic preservation board or local legislature operating under
such an ordinance could designate a statute of a Confederate soldier as a historic landmark in order to
prevent its otherwise lawful removal. Such a monument would also receive legal protection against
demolition if it is within a historic district, such as a courthouse square or residential neighborhood, and
if it was erected there within the district’s period of significance. 27
However, incidents of local preservation laws protecting Confederate monuments seem rare or
non-existant. In the one example Phelps and Owley cite, the Rockville, Maryland preservation
commission permitted removal of a more than 100 year old statue of a Confederate soldier located
within a historic district.28 The Rockville, Maryland preservation commission ruled that the statue did
not contribute to the significance of the historic courthouse grounds, because it had been moved to the
courthouse grounds only in 1971. The case seems to illustrate that preservation commissions can find
grounds within their local law upon which to sanction removal of offensive monuments. The authors
minimize the ease with which removal complied with local historic preservation laws by stressing that
the fact of recent placement would be rare.29
But there are a host of other reasons why local historic preservation laws have not and normally
will not bar removal of Confederate monuments.30 First, statues are not often individually designated for
historic protection. Unless a property is designated individually or as part of a historic district, local
preservation laws do not protect it.31 This is in contrast to Section 106 of the NHPA, which applies to any
property eligible for listing on the National Register, whether actually listed or not.32 Local commissions
and legislative councils, who usually share designation roles in local laws, have discretion not to
designate any property otherwise eligible. Local commissions would share the concerns expressed in the
National Register standards for designating “properties primarily commemorative in nature,” but also
may well respond to the desire of their constituents not to protect monuments with a racist
provenance. Second, local governments already own or have jurisdiction over the most sensitive
Confederate monuments, which are located conspicuously in public parks or the grounds of public
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buildings. Local governments may feel that they need not designate properties they already control,
because public properties are not threatened by commercial real estate development pressures.
Third, many communities never get to the point of considering whether their local laws permit
removal of a Confederate memorial because other factors prevent reaching the legal question. Of
course, state statutes prohibiting removal of Confederate monuments prevent local governments from
exercising their local preservation laws. Virginia recently repealed its 1904 prohibitory law with one
authorizing local governments to "remove, relocate, contextualize or cover” Confederate memorials.33
Cities such as Norfolk, Richmond, and Charlottesville previously have either decided to or seriously
studied removing Confederate memorials, so now may we may have a chance to test whether their local
preservation laws deter what seems to be a strong desire to act.
Some local communities never test their local preservation ordinance because they cannot
reach a firm political decision. This may reflect a political stalemate between those repulsed by the
monuments and those wishing to retain them. But it just as well may result from practical concerns such
as overlapping authority over the memorial or site, costs concerns, and an inability to persuade any
acceptable party to take custody of the monument. In the Rockville, Maryland case discussed by Phelps
and Owley, the City refused to take possession of the “Johnny Reb” statue from Montgomery County
because it lacked a suitable site for the 18 foot tall and 11,000 pound statue, and did not want to bear
ongoing costs of upkeep and security.34 Eventually, the County offered the statue on Craigslist and it was
acquired by a private ferry operator who appears to be a neo-Confederate enthusiast, an embarrassing
outcome for the County.35 Few reputable entities seek to possess Confederate monuments. In short, all
sorts of practical concerns can prevent a locality from agreeing on an acceptable plan of removal
regardless of its leeway under its local preservation law.
Finally, once a local government decides to remove a memorial it has ample authority to do so,
regardless of its preservation law. Local preservation laws can be superseded by subsequent local
legislation. Many local governments keep political control over the designation process, but even if that
decsision is largely delegated to a historical preservation commission, exceptions can be made by
legislation. In many cases, legislation will be required to remove the memorial because it must be
disposed of, contracts let to remove, transport, and install it, and funds appropriated. Pertinent
legislation can easily provide that the local preservation law shall be no impediment to the project.
Preservationists understandably dislike ad hoc legislative exceptions to existing protections, but
Confederate monuments already are in a class by themselves.
Phelps and Owley mention the Washington, DC, provision by which the “Mayor’s Agent” can
authorize the demolition or removal of landmark or contributing property to a historic district when
necessary to construct a project of “special merit.”36 Removing a designated monument offensive to
many citizens as an expression of white supremacy might be found to meet the standard for a special
33
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merit, which is defined as “plan or building having significant benefits to the District of Columbia or to
the community by virtue of exemplary architecture, specific features of land planning, or social or other
benefits having a high priority for community services.”37 However, there never has been a case where
special merit has been found solely though elimination. Such a removal would qualify most easily if a
statute of, say, former Confederate General Albert Pike was replaced by a statue of an honored former
DC resident such as Frederick Douglass.38 While this replacement could be accomplished by statute, 39
proceeding though the Special Merit process would generate an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact,
which would be educational and address the competing narratives of local heritage. While few local
historic preservation ordinances contain special merit provisions, all should.40
Phelps and Owley also provide a careful analysis of the role of conservation and preservation
easements in preventing or complicating the removal of Confederate monuments, as one would expect
from two of the leading scholars of conservation easement law. They circumscribe the issue when they
state that they suggest that “making donation of a conservation easement solely protecting a
Confederate monument [would] be an unlikely occurrence.” 41 They also recognize that easement
holders and property owners have flexibility to amend protective easements, even if doing so requires
careful lawyering, and that third parties generally lack standing to object. 42
They do explore two situations where modifying a historic preservation easement would be
more complicated. First, they consider Confederate monuments on privately-owned battlefields
protected by a conservation easement. They note that it would “present a very real challenge to
conservation easement-holders who have to balance and assess whether additional interpretation,
modification, or removal of the monument is barred under the terms of the easement.”43 Careful and
creative interpretation of such an easement, however, does not seem like an undue hardship for a nonprofit battlefield land trust, the usual easement holder. More broadly, a land trust’s decision does not
affect today’s civic life to any degree comparable to a municipality, because there is no government
affirmation behind the monument.44 Finally, as argued above, rural battlefields telling the story of
important battles and containing memorial to both armies seem the best or least bad location for
Confederate monuments.45
Second, the authors describe the more complex situation where Baltimore’s mayor removed
several Confederate monuments subject to easements held by the Maryland Historic Trust (“MHT”), a
37
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state agency. MHT took the easements in 1984 as the result of its funding maintenance of the statues,
which stood on public land. The mayor acted without MHT consent, which violates the terms of the
easement. This case is far more sensitive than any battlefield case, because the statues stood on public
land in a city roiled by racial unrest. Phelps and Owley properly indicate the legal troubles that could
emerge from this mix, but risk appearing naïve in concluding that Baltimore has been “fortunate” that
neither MHT nor the state attorney general has legally challenged the removal.46 No Maryland official
wants to exercise their legal authority to force Baltimore to remount monuments rejected by the
overwhelming sentiment of Baltimore citizens.47 The continuing problem with these monuments is that
no one wants to take possession of them: they remain “hidden from the public inside a small pen made
of Jersey barriers.”48
Conclusion
Historic preservation law does not seriously impede the removal or contextualization of
Confederate memorials. The tangled and toxic heritage they signify does. The law may create the
context within which parties contend about the meaning and continuing value of these monuments.
Preservation law has many gaskets through which the vile humors of our past can be dissipated. Phelps
and Owley gave a useful account of the machinery of preservation but do not fully credit the extent to
which in application it permits people today to shape the heritage needed to foster the contemporary
culture we aspire to. Preservation law is not so much “etched in stone,” as a living requirement that we
collectively, carefully address what remnants of the past to retain and what to discard.
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